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PARTY WALLS.
RIGHT TO BUILD WALL IN PART ON NEIGHBOR LOT.
The second section of the act of Feb. 24th, 1721,1 enacts that
"The surveyors or regulators [of Philadelphia] upon application
to them made, shall have full power and authority to enter upon
the land of any person or persons in order to set out the founda-
tion-, and regulate the walls to be built between party and party,
which foundation shall be laid equally upon the lands of the per-
sons between whom such party-wall is to be made." Similar
legislation exists as to cities of the second class 2 and of the third
class.' Boroughs likewise are authorized by ordinance to
permit the building of party-walls. In the absence of legislation,
the owner of one lot has no right to plant the wall adjoining his
neighbor, in part on that neighbor's lot.4 "The regulation of party-
walls" says Mitchell J., "is a very ancient form of exercise of the
police power, and came to Pennsylvania from the customs of
London, like so many other parts of our early law. * * *
But such regulation, as it exists in this and most other states is
an interference with the rights and enjoyment of property, sus-
13 Stewart's Pardon 2836. The act of Ap. 8, 1872, regulated the subject
in Pittsburg; Hoffstot v. Voight, 146 Pa. 632.
'Stewart's Purdon, 3123.
'3 Stewart's Purdon, 3123.
4Euwer v. Henderson, 1 Penny. 463. (New Castle). The owner of
the invaded lot may compel the removal of the wall from his ground or
could use it without compensation. The huiding on lot b having made use
of a wall on lot a, in Reading at a time when there was no statute or
ordinance on the subject, the rights of the owner must be determined by
common law principles; McManus v. McIlvaine, 2 Woodw. 146. Cf. Ritter
v. Sieger, 105 Pa. 400 (Allentown).
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tainable only on the police power, and therefore to be governed
and measured by the strict extent of the statutory grant.",
Trunkey J., was of the opinion, in 1883, that the party-wall legis-
lation had "proved a just and beneficial rule for owners of adjoin-
ing lots."0  The right to throw a portion of the wall upon the
neighbor lot "arises out of a provision of the law," says Clarke J.7
"to which all owners of real property in the city of Philadelphia
are subject and in reference to which all conveyances of land,
whether in fee or for years, must be supposed to have been made
and accepted."
OBJECTS OF THE LEGISLATION.
The object of party-wall legislation is obvious. It saves in
cities and boroughs, the consumption of an unnecessary amount of
space in division walls. It subjects these and all walls to the
supervision of officers, so as to secure to walls the necessary
strength and prevent fires and collapses, with incidental loss of
property and life.'
AMOUNT OF INVASION OF NEIGHBOR LOT.
The act of 1721 directs that the foundation of the division
wall "shall be laid equally" upon the lots. But the first builder
might choose to erect a very thick wall, for objects of his own,
and when a wall of that thickness would probably be of no
future advantage to the owner of the next lot. There ought
therefore to be some limit to thickness of party-walls or to the
amount of space beyond the division line, which they should be
permitted to cover, without the consent of the owner of the next
lot. The act of 1721 gave to the surveyors or regulators the
power to determine what should be the breadth or thickness of the
walls.9 The act of May 7th 1855,first limited the right of encroach-
ment. A lot of the width of 16 feet or less, it ordained should not
.Hoffstot v. Voight, 146 Pa. 633. An act giving Allentown the power
to legislate for party-walls, is considered in Giess v. Schatt, 14 C. C. 177.
'Western Nat. Bank's -Ap. 102 Pa. 171.
"Barnes v. Wilson, 116 Pa. 303. fhe legislation is "no invasion of
the right of property," Lowrie J.; Evans v. Jayne, 23 Pa. 34.
'Bowers v. Supplee, A1 Phila. 223. The 8th section of the act'of
June 7th 1895, P. L. LiS entitled "an act regulating the construction, main-
tenance, alteration and inspection of buildings and party-walls in cities
of the 2d class" is constitutional. The first builder may by contract pre-
clude his compelling compensation from the subsequent builder; Shenk
v. Pittsburg Club, 45 Pitts. L. J. 464.
'Vollmer's Appeal 61 Pa. 118; Kirby v. Fitzpatrick, 168 Pa. 434.
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u, encumbered by more than 9 inches of the stone foundation wall,
or more man 4!2 inches of the brick wall. In no case should any
party-wall be placed on the adjoining lot more than 10 inches
for the -stone wall, and more than 63/2 inches for the brick wall.
the act also determined the minimum thickness of party-walls,
which was to be determined by the height and width of the build-
ing. The act of 11 April 1856, regulated the thicxuess by the
height alone of the building.: Within these limits the amount of
encroachment in any case, is determined by the regulators (or
inspectors.) The "first builder" has never had the right to decide
it.10 The regulators may authorize and require a wall thicker
than the minimum; e. g. a wall thirteen inches thick, the first
builder desiring to build one of only 9 inches.11 Although the
ideal of a party-wall expressed in the act of 1721, is one which
rests equally upon the two lots,12 it is evident that when the wall
exceeds certain thicknesses, more of it 'must rest on the first
builder's lot than upon the adjacent one. If A's lot is more than
16 feet wide, e. g. is LoY2 feet wide, the owner of the next lot
may occupy 6Y2 inches of it, althotgh if A s lot were only 16 feet
wide or less, the party-wall could not occupy more than 4Y2
inches of it.'s
WHEN WALL OVERREACHES TOO MUCH.
If the wall is being built too much upon the next lot, the
owner of that lot may secure an injunction against the continuance
of the erection.14  But after the completion of the wall, the courts
are reluctant to order that it be taken down. '1he foundation
was properly laid. The brick wall erected on it however, was
at some places Y of an inch too far over, and at other places
4 to 7g inch. The wall was not perpendicular. The adjoining
owner had however used it, and the buildings on both lots [erected
at the same time] were under roof. He was remitted to his
"Kirby v. Fitzpatrick, 168 Pa. 435; Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. 118;
Mayer's Appeal, 73 Pa. 164; Derringer v. Augusta Hotel Co., 155 Pa. 609;
Lukens v. Lasher, 10 Dist. 385, 202 Pa. 327. Six and one-half inches was
the maximum encroachment in Chester, under its charter; May v. Pren-
dergast, 12 C. C. 220.
'Bowers v. Supplee, 11 Phila., 223.
"Beaver v. Nutter, 10 Phila. 345.
"Morris v. Balderston, 2 Br~wst. 459.
"May v. Prendergast, 12 C. C. 220; Chester. The law requiring the
wall not fo cover more than , - inches of the next lot, one covering five
inches was enjoined.
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remedies at law.", The wall was put 22 inches further upon the
next lot than the law allowed. A bill was filed by B, owner of
the'next lot, to compel the removal of the encroachment but it
was compromised. L'estimony was taken as to the amount of
damage suffered by B. It resulted in an award of $1000; and the
decree provided that the payment of the $1000 should not be
construed to convey to A, the defendant, any title to the ground
encroached upon. Subsequently B conveyed his lot to C with -a
covenant of warranty. C upon this covenant could recover
damages which in the absence of other evidence would be taken
to be $1000, the amount which B had recovered from A.16
A wall extended s of an inch too far on the next lot. In order
to strengthen the wall, the builder braced it by inserting 65 iron
rods or bolts, extending through it and projecting 1/4 inches, and
each fastened by a nut and a star-shaped plate 934 inches in diam-
eter. A demurrer to the bill, asking for an injunction was sus-
tained, because there was an adequate remedy at law.'7
NEW WALL.
i ne fact that an existing wall invades only 432 inches, does
not make it unlawful for the owner of one of the lots, desiring to
erect a hotel nine stories high, to tear down the party wall and
erect another which will encroach to the maximum of 6Y2 inches.
The court will therefore not enjoin against .the building of the
second wait.
AGREEMENT FOR GREATER INTRUSION.
The owners of the adjacent lots may agree that the wall,
erected by A, one of them, shall be put farther within B's- lot than
he would have a right by law to put it. They may agree, e. g.
that A, who is about to erect a house on his lot, may build an
alley 30 inches wide, one-half of which shall be on B's 'lot. This
requires that for the first story, the party-wall shall be more than
15 inches over the division line. The wall for the second and
third stories, is at the normal position. When, later, B erects a
'Mayer's Appeal, 73 Pa. 164.
"tKing's Estate, 18 W. N. 155 affirmed in Edmund's Appeal, 19 W. N.
59. By accepting the $1000, B had authorized the encroachment.
'Walsh v. Luburg, 10 C. C. 641.
'Deringer v. Augusta Hotel Co., 155 Pa. 609; Bailey's Appeal 1 W. N.
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house, using the alley wall, he must pay for it as well as for the
upper portion of the party-wall.1 9
WALL NOT AS rAR OVER AS PERMISSIBLE.
If the foundation of a wall erected by the owner of a lot, A,
is partly on the next lot, owned by B, the wall erected upon it is a
party-wall, with the incident that B can use it, although it is wholly
within A's lot,2" a fortiori if it is in part over the division line,
though not so far over as the law permits.21 This would be so,
whether the foundation was as much on the next lot as the law
allowed, or not.2
WALL NOT OVER AT ALL.
Can A, one of two owners of adjacent lots, 'by building the
wall towards B, his neighbor's lot, wholly within his own lot,
destroy the right of B to a party-wall? If he cannot, B must
have .the right either to have the wall already built tondemned
and removed, (a right which Paxson J., seems have thought to
exist)2 3 to make place for the party-wall, or B must have the
right to use this wall, as if it were a party-wall, a right the exis-
terice of which Sharswood J., seems to assert.24 "Every owner of
a lot of ground in Philadelphia" said Trunkey J., "has a statutory
right to make a party-wall between himself and his neighbor, and
may enter upon the adjoining lot for that purpose, not going
beyond the prescribed limit. His right cannot be taken from him
by the adjoining owner building exclusively upon his own land,
either to the line, or a short distance therefrom."25 Finletter J., has
said that "The law compels the first builder to erect the wall partly
upon the adjoining land and thereby and for that purpose, gives
him an easement thereon.1 26 If, A's wall is farther from the
division'line than a party-wall erected-by B might lawfully extend
B doubtless could not build up to and thus use this wall. Thus,
if A builds a house whose wall is four feet from the division line,
B could not build up to that wall, but he could build a party-wall
"Haines v. Dripps, 2 Pars. 236.
'Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171; Milne's Appeal, 81 Pi. 54;
Lukens v. Lasher, 10 Dist. 385, 202 Pa. 327.
'Milne's Appeal, 2 W. iN. b13.
"Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171.
'Milne's Appeal, 2 W. N. 513.
"Milne's Appeal, 2 W. N. 513.
'Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171.
"Mc Gettigan v. Evans, 8 Phila. 264.
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placed in part on A's lot.2" There are however announcements of
a contrary view. Whether, a wall being Wholly on A's lot but
upon the division line, B the owner of the next has a right to use
it as a party-wall, is made by Potter J., to depend on A's intention,
in erecting the wall, as to its being a party-wall. s Paxson J.,
said that if the wall stood wholly on A's land, the owner of the
next lot would have "no right to use the wall with or without
compensation." 2  The better view is that first expressed. If A
builds a wall wholly upon his own land, but so near to the division
line that B would have a right to project his party-wall to it, were
the wall not there, he may regard this as a party-wall, whatever
A's intention was in building it.30
NO RIGHT TO PARTY-WALL.
It has been occasionally said that A has no right to use. a
portion of B's ground for a party-wall, when there is no suffcient
likelihood that this wall will be of use to B. A singular applica-
tion of this principle appears in Rodearmel v. Hutchison.3 ' A had
erected a front building to the division line. This building was
30 feet deep. He erected a back building, but narrowed it, so
that its wall, facing B's lot, stood 6 feet from the division line.
B subsequently erected a house whose back and front parts were
of equal width. The front was 36 feet deep. Oddly, Pearson J.,
held that B could build the party-wall back six feet to accommo-
'Monroe v. Conroy, I Phila. 441. Apparently a wall wholly on A's
land, which was insufficient for B's purposes was ordered by the inspectors
to be taken down by B, owner of the next lot, in order that B might erect
a more suitable party-wall, Childs v. Napheys, 112 Pa. 504. In Bowers v.
Hatch, 15 Phila. 163, A was buildifg a side extension to his house. The
inspector complained to the Common Pleas that he was erecting said
wooden extension "to the party line without the necessary and, proper
party-wall ;" said extension being built to the party line without a party or
fire wall between it and -the adjoining property."
'Bright v. Allan, 203 Pa. 394.
'Ritter v. Sieger, 105 Pa. 400. See, also, Harrison v. Baik, 13 Super.
274; Beaver v. Hutchison, 2 Pears.. 325.'
"Ewing P. J., held in Masonic Fund Society v. Hamilton, 32 Pitts.
L. J. 386, that, when A had erected a 'substantial wall wholly upon his own
ground at the boundary, B, the owner of, the next lot, could not
take down this wall and erect a party-wall, one-half on A's lot. The act
of April 8th 1872 P. L. 986 was not intended to cover such a case. It would
be unconstitutional if it were.
'2 Pears. 325. An opinion on the same question was withheld by
Parsons J., in Sutcliff v. Isaacs, 1 Pars, Eq. 494.
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uate tne iront of his house, but could not prolong the wall for the
accommoaation ot the back portion. Yet the six teet extension
wouic be oi no more use to A, than the still greater extension.
in another case- he applied the same.principle. A owned a lot,
ironung on A. street, and running back to an alley. B3 ownea a
iot also ironting on .X street, and running back to the alley. But
it was bounae at one side by Y street, and at the other by A s
iot. A had a dwelling on his lot, fronting on X street, as also had
B. S subsequently built a house facing on Y street, upon the rear
ot his lot and he proposed to build its western wall in part on A's
lot. The court decided that he had no right, since there was no
probr bility that the wall would ever be used by A. On the other
hand, cases have recognized that buildings erected on the rears
ot lots were entitled to part-wall. 33 A having a house, on tme
tront o± his lot, t erects a printing establishment on the rear of
the next lot, planting the wall in part on both lots."
In placeswith respect to which there is no party-wall legisla-
tion, there is perhaps no right in A owning a lot to use a wall
erected wholly on B's lot, as a party-wall, unless it has been ob-
tained by grant from B, or unless it has been used so long and
adversely, as to constitute a prescription. In Harrison v. Bank'-
a house was erected on lot X, in 1831, by the owner. The west
wall was wholly on the lot. Four years later, the owner of the lot
Y to the west, built a house thereon, similar in material and other
respects, to the house on X, and using the west wall on X as its
east wall, fastening the timbers of the roof together with an iron
strap, inserting the beam on the third floor in the wall, and
attaching it to a like beam in-the next house, by an iron strap. He
interlocked the front wall of the'house with the wall of the nex'
thus making a solid and continuous front for the two houses.
The owner of X sold it to C in 1839, and C sold it to D in 1866,
and D sold it to E, in 1899. E began to tear down the building,
and its west wall, with a view to the erection of a larger and
better building. The owner of Y 'filed a bill to restrain the
removal of the wall, alleging that it had become a party-wall.
A preliminary injunction granted was dissolved. It was said by
whitman v. Shoemaker, 2 Pears. 320.
Datz v. Phillips, 137 Pa. 203. No right to put windows in the party-
wall.
"'McCall v. Barrie, 14 W. N. 419; McCall's Appeal, 16 W. N. 95.
"13 Super. 274.
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the Superior Court that the right to use the wall as a party-wall
depends on grant or prescription. *-iere was no evidence of a
grant, nor that the use of the wall was merely permissive. Pos-
sibly the evidence in a suit between the original owners of the
buildings would have put on E, the defendant, the burden of
proving that the use of the wall was not under a claim of right.
But whether when Ebought lot X, he was bound to know of the use
which the plaintiff had been making of the wall and that he had
by prescription or otherwise acquired a right to the continued use
of it Was not sufficiently clear to warrant the reversal of the dis-
solution of the injunction.
PRELIMINARY TO BUILDING.
The 4th section of the act of April 15th 1782, penalizes the
commencement of the erection of a party-wall in Philadelphia,
before the boundaries of the lot shall be adjusted and marked out
by the regulators.. The 1st section of the act of Feb. 24th 1721
directs that the surveyors or regulators upon application to them
shall have full power and authority to enter on lands, in order
to set out the foundations, and regulate the walls to be built
between party and party. The court will enjoin the construction
of a party-wall, before a survey has been made by a regulator.38
If however the wall is erected, the owner of the next lot will
doubtless hive a right to use it, but not without making compen-
sation." If the permit obtained authorizes a wall of a certain
thickness, the erection of a wall of a greater thickness will be a
trespass. The land improperly covered by the -wall, may be
recovered in ejectment. 88
DECISION OF THE REGULATOR.
Under the act of 1721, the decision of the regulators, finless
appealed from, was final as respects the location of the wall,39
and its thickness.40  A mistake by them w6uld not change the
"Sutcliff v, Isaacs, 1 Pars. Eq. 494.
"In Ritter v. Sieger, 105 P. L. 400, A having built a wall over upon
B's lot, it was said that perhaps B could have used the wall w'thout com-
pensation But it does not appear that there was legislation under which a
party-wall might have been erected in Allentown.
'Kirby v. Fitzpatrick, 168 Pa. 434.
'Godshall v. Mariam, I Binn. 352; Sutcliff v. Isaacs, 1 Pars. Eq. 494.
If the decis on were not conclusive, it is said that the wall might be pulled
down, which would be an intolerable hardship. Witman v. Shoemaker,
2 Pears. 320; Rodearmel v. Hutchison, 2 Pears. 324.
"'Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171.
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character of the wall.4" An appeal to the common pleas is pro-
vided for by that act, and by the act of April 15th 1782.42 In
cities of the third class, Pearson J., remarks, the decision of the
regulator is not conclusive, as it is in Philadelphia. 43 "What would
be the right of either owner if the foundation were mistakenly
placed by the regulators, or by act of the owners, so far from the
line as to leave room to buiid a party-wall on the line," was left
unanswered by Trunkey J., in Western National Bank's Appeal."
4
APPEAL FROM REGULATORS.
The appeal under the act of ./21 and 1782 for Philadelphia,
and under the act of March 9th 1781 for the Northern Liberties "
was to the common pleas. Under the act of 1782, it was held that
on an appeal, ejectment was the proper mode of trying the title.46
tTnder the act of May 20th 1857, respecting tearing down
party-walls which are insufficient for a new building about to be
erected the appeal was notto the common pleas but to the board
of surveyors,4 T according to the provisions of the act of April 11th
1856. P. L. 320. If the common pleas has jurisdiction at all. it
is only to enforce the decision of the inspectors by restraining the
owner who objects to the tearing down of the wall, from hinder-
ing it.4 So, under the act of April 5th 1849, the decision of the
surveyor as to the taking down of the party-wall, would not be
appealed to the common pleas. That act provided for the execu-
tion of the order by the sheriff, upon a writ issued from the
common pleas.49  Pending the appeal from an order of the
inspectors that a party-wall be taken down, the court will refrain
from dissolving an injunction already granted.50
INSPECTORS INJUNCTION.
The inspector who has required a wall of certain thickness
may obtain an injunction against the erection of one of a less
"Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171.
'3 Stewart, Purdon, 2838.
"2 Pears. 320; 2 Pears. 324.
"102 Pa. 171.
"Godshall v. Mariam, 1 Binn. 352.
"Wells v. Fox; 1 Dall. 308.
'Magrath v. Cooper, 10 W. N. 173.
"'Childs v. Napheys, 112 Pa. 504.
"Evans v. Jayne, 23 Pa. 34.
1'Magrath v. Cooper, 10 W. N. 173.
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thickness. 51 In Bowers v. Hatch5'2 he obtained an injunction
against the extension by X, from the side of his house to the
division line, of a wooden structure "without the necessary and
proper party-wall provided for by the act of assembly."
ADVANCING TO THE STREET.
In Duncan v. Hanbest" on a certain lot X, was a house
whose front stood 30 inches back of the building line. Prior
to 1805 a house was erected on the adjoining lotY, whose front
likewise receded 30 inches. Other houses were similarly set
back. Fifty years later, the owner of X obtained authority from
the city surveyor to move his front to the building line, and to
extend the party-wall, which covered 43/2 inches of Y. The
supreme court at nisi prius, enjoined against the building of the
wall upon Y. Knox J., conceded that there was no sufficient evi.
dence that the space of 30 inches had been dedicated to the public;
that the right to advance the front was an incident of ownership,
and is not lost by non-use; but that the defendant had no right to
use any part of Y, for the lateral wall, apparently because the
thus extended wall would be of no use to the owner of Y who did
not desire to move his front. "Instead therefore of being bene-
fitted by the extension of the wall" says Knox J., "they (the
plaintiff, owner of Y) would be injured by it, and they are un-
willing that any portion of the wall should be placed upon their
ground. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that
the defendant has no legal right to extend the party-wall upon
the plaintiff's land and that any extension of his building
defendant may make, must be confined& exclusively to his own lot."
This decision is apparently repudiated in Western National Bank's
Appeal' 5 where the stories of two adjacent buildings, above the
first, had receded 28 inches from the building line, and from the
front of the first story. The owner of one tore it down. and
Mide the new buildine come out for its entire heieht to the build-
ing line. It was held that he had a right to extend the party-wall
to that line. The master thought that the doctrine of Duncan
v. Ihnbest. "was opposed to the intent as well as the letter of the
law." The supreme court affirmed the defendant's right thus to
extend the party-wall.
"Bowers v. Supplee, 11 Phila. 223.
'15 Phila. 163.
."2 Brewst.- 362.
"102 Pa. 171.
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WALL SOLID---WINDOWS.
When A builds a wall in part on B's lot, under the statu-
tory power, he undertakes to build a wall that shall possess certain
characteristics. It should be made perpendicular. It should
have the width prescribed; and be built of good material. It must
be solid, that is, openings must not be left in any part of it, in
order to admit light, and air to the building. The court, at the
instance of the owner of the next lot, on which the wall intrudes,
will enjoin against the making,55 or if made, against the contin-
uance of the openings, that is, will require that they be filled with
a solid wall.56 This will happen, although the window frames
are wholly within A's line57 and although being made to open
like doors, they open inwards58 and although, the foundation
extending over B's line, the wall put on it is wholly within A's.5 9
The right to complain of the windows may be lost by entering
into an agreement concerning them, and by the plaintiff's non-
performance of what he has agreed to do, so that closing the
windows would be inequitable.60 But it is not lost by a toleration
of the windowsfor a long period of years.61 It is said that if A,
in building the wall, did not intend to encroach on B's land, the
wall, although it does in fact encroach, is not a party-wall; that
so much of the wall as encroaches can be removed, and that
then windows can be maintained in the wall,62 and when the
wall is wholly on A's land, he may maintain windows in it. B's
only remedy for the annoyance of his lot's being overlooked from
the windows would be his erection, on his own ground, of a fence
or wall.63 A is allowed to cause rectangular recesses to be made
at intervals, and to put windows in the three walls of these
recesses. The wall was made solid from one end to the other to
the height of 16 feet. This height was increased to six stories
'Vansyckel v. Tryon, 6 Phila. 401.
'Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. 118; King's Estate, 18 W. N. 155; Vansyckel
v. Tryon. 6 Phila. 401; Pile v. Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296.
"6 Phila. 401.
"Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. 118.
"Milne's Appeal, 81 Pa. 54.
'Datz v. Phillips, 137 Pa. 203.
'Milne's Appeal, 81 Pa. 54. The windows could be closed by the
neighbor after they had been used 75 years. A bill to prevent the closing
was dismissed; Roudet v. Bedell, 1 Phila. 366.
cnPile v. Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296.
"Pearson P. J., 13 Phila. 502; Milne's Appeal, 81 Pa. 54.
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except at three places, which were 40 and 50 feet apart. The
first of these openings was 20 feet wide, the second and third
12 feet wide. The wall was doubled back at these openings, 9
feet, and windows put into the three walls of these wells. An
injunction against the construction was refused.6 4 Openings not
designed for windows are also forbidden. To the height of an
existing party-walls, B made an addition of 40 feet, leaving three
openings, one above the other, each 9 feet wide and 10 feet high.
The court compelled B to fill tip these openings, on the complaint
of A.6r The existence of slits for ventilation in the upper part
of the wall of a music hall, did not justify the use of it by the
owner of the adjacent lot without compensation.Y B may give
a license to A to put windows in the party-wall erected by him,
until B shall desire them filled. Such license is revoked by B's
conveyance of his lot.
6 7
REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER INVASION OF ADJACENT LOT.
If for any reason A's invasion of the lot of his neighbor B,
in the erection of a wall is unathorized by law, B has appropriate
remedies. If the wall is about to be erected under an unfounded
claim of right to make it a party-wallthe erection of it may be
enjoined at the suit of B.68 Ejectment may also be employed to
recover the possession of land improperly covered by a wall built
thicker than the regulator has allowed0 9 But, when it would
be a eTeat hardship to the builder of the party-wall, to compel him
to take it down, and the injury can be compensated in damages
the court will refuse to reauire the wall to be taken down. This
was so in a case where the foundation required by law had not
been given to the wall, the wall had consequently settled and
spread so that tie bolts etc., were necessary which projected
over the next lot.7 0  If the regulator having fixed the line at B's
request A, owner of the next lot on being notified expresses satis-
faction with any line the regulator may fix and directs B to erect
0 McCali's Appeal, 16 W. N. 95.
'Bedell v. Rittenhouse Co., 5 Dist. 689.
'Oakes v. Senneff, 4 W. N. 413.
'Vollmer's Appeal, 61 Pa. 118. B asking for an injunction, the burden
of proving the license is on A.
'Rodearmel v. Huthcison, 2 Pears. 324; Whitman v. Shoemaker,
2 Pears. 320; Wistar's Appeal, 6 W. N. 140; Western Nat. Bank's Appeal,
102 Pa. 171.
'Kirby v. Fitzpatrick, 168 Pa. 434.
"Mulligan v. Fitzpatrick, 10 C. C. 1/9.
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upon the line, he will be estopped, after the party-wall is erected,
from denying that it is at the proper place, and from recovering
the land upon which it is erected.
7
1
"Marsh v. Weckerly, 13 Pa. 250
PARTY-WALL BY PRESCRIPTION.
If a wall has been used by houses on both sides of it, as a
part thereof, for a period of 21 years, or longer, the wall becomes
a party-wall, whether it is equally or unequally upon the lots, or is
wholly upon one of them. A wall thus becoming a party-wall by
prescription, has the attributes of other party-walls. It can be
ordered down, by the surveyors, when the owner of one of the
houses desires to tear it- down and erect another, the wall being
found inadequate, or he can make use of it if adequate for his
new house, no less than of the one replaced by it.72 If A in
erecting his house, by mistake plants the wall diagonally across
the line dividing his lot from B, so that the front portion of the
wall is wholly on A's lot, and the rear portion wholly on B's and
B subseauently erects a house using this wall, and increasing its
height slizhtly at the same time, after more than 21 years, in
making alterations in the house, he may increase the height of
the division wall. It was said by Woodward J., that B owned
so much of the wall as was on his lot-, that, as he had used the part
on A's as a part of his. house, he had more than an easement in
it: it bad-become common property. Hence D might increase the
height of it, even in the absence of any party-wall legislation.7s
P.A~XY-WALL BY AGREZ?4ENT.
The parties who own contiguous lots may agree to bestow
upon a wall the. properties of a party-wall when there is no
legislation which authorizes one- of them. to build a wall partly
on the land of'the other, or when the wall in contemplation has
"MoVey v. Durkin, 136 Pa. 418. Hence it is no tresoass to have torn
down a part of the wall found inadequate f-r the new buildinz, and to
use for the new buildinzr the other portion of the old wall. Cf, Western
Nat. Bank's Appeeal, 102 Pa. 171; Harrison v. Bank, 13 Super. 274.
"McManus v, Mcllvaine, 2 Woodw. 146. A party-wall is owned in
fee one-half- by the owner of one of the lots, and the other half by the
owner of the other lot. If A owns two lots and builds houses upon each
at the same time, making a division wall, the longitudinal centre U=n of
which is- not emaetly coincident with the division line of the lots, and
subsequently sells one of these lots he must be understood to convey up
to the centre line of the wall, so as to make the grantee owner in fee
of one-half of the wall; Mt4ara v. DuBois, 187 Pa. 431.
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not been erected in part on both lots. Thus, no law authorizing
a party-wall, A may agree with his neighbor B that he A, shall
erect a wall in part on B's land, and that B, on subsequently using
it, shall make compensation to A. Though oral, if this license is
acted on by A, it is irrevocable. B later sells his lot to C, who
using the wall, gives his bond for one-half of the value of the
wall. C becomes insolvent and B again becomes owner of the
lot by purchasing it at sheriff's sale. This does not reimpose on B
the duty of paying A for the wall. C and not B had made use of
the wall. The claim for compensation was -merged in the bond,
and not revived against B by his repurchase.74 A owning a lot on
which was a house whose wall, next to B's lot to the east, is
wholly on A's lot, agrees in writing with B, to grant, bargain and
sell to B the "equal undivided half of the wall." The agreement
further stipulated that B should have the right to break into the
wall to the depth of 42 inches, for the support of joists and
girders, and to plaster against the wall, and to raise it above the
roof. It was held that B, who subsequently to the erection of a
house, making use of the wall, desired to change its front, by
making it of stone, might take out the bricks of the party-wall
to the middle line, and extend the stone front to that line.75
TAKING DOWN INSUFFICIENT WALL.
The act of May 20th, 1857, P. L. 500, makes it the duty of
the inspectors of buildings in Philadelphia, on the application of
any person who is about to erect on his lot a new building, "to
examine all such party or division walls upon or adjoining said
"4Euwer v. Henderson, 1 Penny. 463.
"Nightingale v. Wood, 1 North 201. A having built a foundation
which he intended to be wholly on his own land, but which projected one
and -% inches over the division line, the wall above it being wholly upon
his land, offered to his neighbor B to make it a party-wall, if he would
consent to the continuance of windows in the 3d and 4th stories. He
declined to consent. B filed a bill to compel the removal of the wall.
The master found the intrusion, and that it could not be rectified by re-
moval of the wall, without consent of the building inspectors. They
subsequently consented. The court decreed that A have leave to remove
the portion of the wall that was on B's ground, but stipulated that there
should be no entering upon B's ground, or digging into it. B refused
permission to enter his land and chop off- the projecting stones -of the
foundation. The wall had threfore, to be taken down and rebuilt. A
division of the costs of the case was decreed. Affirmed; Pile v. Pedrick,
167 Pa. 296. Williams J., says the wall was not a party-wall, apparently,
because it was not intended to be placed on B's land.
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lot of ground, and which shall have been erected prior thereto,
and if deemed and adjudged by them to be insufficient and unfit
for the purpose of such new building about to be erected, such
party or division walls shall be removed and taken down by the
last builder, the cost and expense of that removal, together with
the cost and expense of the new wall or walls to be erected in
lieu thereof, shall be borne and paid exclusively by him." The
act provides for an appeal from the inspectors to the board of
surveys.
THE WALL TAKEN DOWN.
This act applies not merely to party-walls, but also to "divi-
sion walls ;" not only to walls "upon" but wall "adjoining said lot."
A owning two lots upon which he simultaneously erects buildings,
conveys these lots to different persons. Forty years after, the
owner of one of the lots desires to erect a larger building. The
inspectors deeming the frame partition between the back buildings
ihsufficient, may order it to be taken down, and the person who
"'-_. procured the order commits no trespass in taking down tle
-wall or partition.76 The wall does not need to be a partv-wall, to
stand in part upon both lots.71 The act of April 5th 1849, P. L.
411, provided for the removal of party-walls, and was applicable
only to Dgrtv-walls in the strict sense, walls "built half on each
side of the line of the lots." 7 8 The wall between the front oarts
of the houses being stone, and that between the back parts being
frame. the insoectors rnav, when the owner of one of the lots
desires to tear down his house and erect another, order down the
IrRvne omrtition. only."
ORDERING DOWN AILEY WALLS.
B, one of the owners of two adiacent lots, desires to tear
down the- party-wall and erect a higher bitildinz. There is an
alley between the -houses. The inspectors condemn the wall, and
order a stronver wall created. The wall stands upon the arch
of the alley, whose two lets are condemned as insuifficient also,
B mav tear down both levs of the arch, and erect others. They
ire a art of the party-wall. The power to order down the wall
incliide the rwer to order .down these legs.".
"McVey v. Durkin, 136 Pa. 418; Childs v. Napheys, 112 Pa. 504.
See Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171.
"THurlburt v. Firth, 10 Phila. 135.
"Evans v. Jayne, 23 Pa. 34.
"McVey v. Durkin, 136 Pa. 418.
"Helwig v. Schenck, 7 Phila. 389.
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AT WHOSE COST.
The act of May 20th 1857 requires the person who causes
the wall to be condemned to remove it at his own expense. The
4th section of the act of April 11th 1856, supplementary to the act
of April 21st 1855, requires building inspectors, on the request
of 2 citizens to inspect all walls deemed dangerous, and, if found
dangerous, to order the removal at the expense of the owner of
the wall. This did not authorize such an order, at the instigation
of the owner of the next lot who desired to erect a building that
would require a better wall, the wall ordered to be removed being
entirely safe and suitable for the purposes of its owner. The
4th section was "obviously intended to secure the safety of, the
community, by causing dangerous walls to be renewed; not to
enable parties who desired to change or make use of their
neighbor's walls to compel them to pull them down or alter them
to suit their purposes.""' Compelling him who causes the wall
to be taken down to bear the cost is, thinks Lowrie J., "the best
protection against the abuse of the right. 3  The next owner is
not compellable to pay for the new wall until he makes- some use
of it different from the use he has been making of the first one."
PREMISES IN POSSESSION OF TENANT.
The party-wall, which is insufficient for the uses of the owner
of the next lot may be ordered down, and he may be authorized
to take it down under the act of 1857, although the- house, of
which it is a part is in the occupancy of a tenant, and although the
house will be made untenantable, because of exposure to wind
and rain, the cutting of water and gas pipes, and the flues for heat-
ine the house. The enforced vacation of the house by the tenant
will be no defence to- an action for the rent."
NECESSITY OF ORDER OF BUILDING INSPECTORS.
The owner of the lot on which the new building is to be
erected, has no right to tear down the party or division wall, until
the building inspectors have ordered that it be torn down. If they
"Ferguson v. Fallows, 2 Phila. 168. The owner of the wall denied
that it was a party-wall and that the neighbor had a right to use it. This
question he wds entitled to have fairly tried. He cannot be deprived of it,
by proceeding under the 4th section. An injunction against the contin-
uance of the wall was dissolved.
"Evans v. Jayne, 23 Pa. 34.
"Hoffstot v. Voight 146 Pa. 632, Pittsburg.
"Barnes v. Wilson, 116 Pa. 303.
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have made no order, a fortiori if they have refused to make the
order, the person applying for it will be enjoined from taking
down the wall, if he tnreatens or begins to do so. Although a
second application to the inspectors is made, and they change
their. minds, and grant the order to remove the wall, if the owner
of the wall appeals to -the board of surveyors, the injuncton will
be continued until its decision is rendered.8 5 If the inspectors
order the wall to be taken down, he who procured the order may
take it down. He needs no order of the court. If he is obstructed
the court will aid him by injunction, or if the interference amounts
to a breach of the peace the offending party -may be bound over
to keep the peace." Probably, he will be liable if he inflicts any
unnecessary injury to his neighlbr,67 but, in an action against him
for forcible entry and damage to building, a nonsuit was properly
granted, it appearing that the entry was for the purpose of plac-
ing supports under the floors of the plaintiff's building, which
was done without objection by plaintiff, and that the removal of
the wall was by the direction of the building inspectors;
there being no evidence that it was negligently done, or unneces-
sarily delayed, in that any avoidable inconvenience was caused to
the plaintiff.88 The owner of the next lot though he may not
recover for the ordinary annoyance, inconvenience and dirt result-
ing from the erection of the adjoining building, may recover com-
pensation for any special injury.89
SUBSEQUENT USE OF NEW WALL.
If the new wall erected by B is higher and longer than the
old, and the owner of the next lot, A, subsequently tears down
his building, and erects a larger, and in so doing uses the whole
of the new party-wall, he must pay half of the value.90
"Magrath v. Cooper, 10 W. N. i/3. In Deringer v. Augusta Hotel
Co., 155 Pa. 609, B -was tearing down his building, and the party-wall.
Whether the inspectors had authorized it, does not appear. A, the owner
of the next lot and house, asked for an injunction against encroaching
more on his land than the former wall did The injunction was refused.
B was not compelled to confine the encroachment of the second wall to
that of the first.
"Childs v. Napheys, 112 Pa. 504
"Cf. McVey v. Durkin, 136 Pa. 418.
'1Buck v. Weeks, 194 Pa. 522. The bearing of the act of June 8th
1893, P. L. 360 was not considered.
-'Swisher v. Sipps, 19 Super. 43.
"Bailey's Appeal, 1 W. N. 350.
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LEGAL OBSTACLE TO USE OF PARTY-WALL.
Perhaps when there is a legal obstacle to the use by B of a
wall as a party-wall, A, the owner of the next lot has no right to
erect a wail m part on J3s lot. Prior to the act of April 26th, isi0,
which fixed the south line of Chestnut Street 26 inches southof the
former line, and required all buildings thereafter erected, to ob-
serve this line, A and B had adjacent lots with buildings on
them. A wall ; or 8 feet high stood in part on A's and in part
on B's lot. B tore down his building, and erected a new one, the
front of which was upon the new line of the street. In doing
so, he tore out the western longitudinal half of the wall, which
rested on his lot. A attempting to rebuild the wall between the
front of B's building and the original line of Chestnut Street,
was enjoined.91
INCREASES OF PARTY-WALL.
A party-wall having been erected, the owner of one of.the
lots may tear down his building, and erect a higher and longer
and in so doing he may increase the height End length of the
party-wall, and invade the next lot to the extent to which the law
allows invasion by a party-wall.9 2 If the owner of lots X and Y
has erected a wall intended to be a division wall and it has been
used by subsequent owners of the lots for more than 21 years,
as a party-wall, it must be considered a party-wall, and although
it is wholly on lot X, the owner of lot Y may heighten it from 3 to
to 12 feet and may remove joists and insert them at different
places, these acts not materially increasing the burden on the wall,
nor weakening it.9 3 The front of a party-wall having been made
to recede 2 feet 4 inches from the building line of the street, the
wall being erected by the owners of the two lots, when A, the
owner of one of these lots subsequently tears down his building
and puts up a new one, he may extend the party-wall up to the
true building line.9'
'Wistar's Appeal, 6 W. N. 140.
'Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171. In MeManus v. Mcllvaine,
2 Woodw. 146, the court refused to enjoin against an increase by 4 feet of
the height .of the party-wall, finding that it was by consent. Cf., Pratt v.
Meigs, 2 Pars. Eq. 302.
"Bright v. Allen, 203 Pa. 394. The owner of a house tears it down,
and erects another as part of a hotel. He increases by 40 feet the height
of the party-wall to the west. His right to do so seems not to be ques-
tioned; Bedell v. Rittenhouse xo., 5Dist. 689.
"Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171.
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WALL BUILT WHOLLY ON LAND OF BUILDER.
When the owner of two lots erects a house or other building
on one ot them, the wall between the jots is not a party-wall in
the statutory sense, it has not the legal incidents of such a wall.",
If he subsequently conveys one of the lots by a boundary over
which the wall stands, he is said to convey so much of the wall
as stands over that boundary. From this it is concluded that
since the grantee owns that portion of the wall, he has a right to
use it when he erects a house, without making compensation,"
unless indeed he has agreed thus to pay for it. In that case, he
must pay, according to his agreement, when he uses it.'7 When
the owner of two lots with houses on them, with a common divi-
sion wall, conveys one of the lots described by course and distance,
and the lot as described, does not go to the middle line of the wall,
the grantee will nevertheless acquire the ground up to that middle
line. "1he wall, as a monument will control course and distance,
and its middle line will be protracted to the rear of the lot, as its
boundary.'
ACQUISITION OF BOTH LOTS BY SAME PERSON.
If after the erection of a building on each of two contiguous
lots belonging to different persons, with a wall between them
which is wholly on one of the lots, they are acquired by the same
person who afterwards sells one of them, he does not destroy the
right to the continued use of the wall, as a party-wall. 9'
PERMITTED USES OF PARTY-WALL.
The first builder who puts the division wall, in part, upon
his neighbor's lot, cannot make as full a use of the wall as he
could if it were not a party-wall. It is elsewhere seen that he
cannot so construct it as to furnish him light and air through
windows. If the party-wall is higher than the house on the next
lot, the builder of it cannot use the part of it above the next house
TVoight v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 520; Mulligan v. Baylie, 11 Dist. 311;
Doyle v. Ritter, 6 Phila. 577. In Wistar's Appeal, 6 W. N. 140, a wall
12 feet high and 13 incheT thick, was said not to be a party-wall. It was
apparently not part of a building.
"Doyle v. Ritter, 6 Phila. 577; Voight v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 520; Mulli-
gan v. Baylie, 11 Dist. 311.
"Voight v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 520.
"Medara v. DuBois, 187 Pa. 431. Hence, the grantee, having got what
he expected, will be compelled to pay the purchase money. Cf. Warfel v.
Knott, 128 Pa. 528.
"Western Nat. Bank's Appeal, 102 Pa. 171.
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lor the painting of a sign upon it.Despite the objection to the
next owner's bill, asking for an injunction, that the matter was
too trivial to attract the notice of a court of equity, and despite the
amdavit that tme painting would not injure the plaintiff, an injunc-
tion was granted.' However, A having eerected a party-wall,
which he was about to paint, the court dismissed a bill of the
owner of the next lot, (alleging that the paint would prevent the
adhesion of plaster to the wall, in case he should want to plaster
against it) on the ground that there was an adequate remedy at
law.2 In Bedell v. The Rittenhouse Co.' there was a party-wall
between houses of which one belonged to A and the other to the
east to B, B also owning the premises further to the east, an
apartment hotel, intending to incorporate into it the lot on the
west. He tears down the house on it, and erects one 40 feet
higher, correspondingly increasing the height of the party-wall.
B conveys the thus enlarged hotel to C, who paints on the party-
wall, above A's house, a large sign, the letters being 4 or 5 feet
high. This sign causes annoyance to A, because it makes people
think that A's house is a part of the hotel. Sulzberger J., en-
joined the continuance of the sign.
CONTRACTUAL PROHIBITION OF PARTY-WALL.
A, in granting a lot to B, while retaining the next lot, may
covenant for a passageway or alley along the line of division but
upon the retained lot, and so preclude B from erecting a party-
wall that would interfere with this passageway.
4
MERCANTILE LIBRARY COMPANY V. UNIVERSITY OF PA.
Lot A belonging to the plantiff, faces upon the west side of
Tenth Street, its south line being some distance north of Chestnut
Street. The plaintiff has laid out orr the southern edge of the lot an
alley 16 feet wide, which he has bound himself to allow the owners
of lots on Chestnut Street, east of lot'B, belonging to defendant,
to use. This alley is curbed and paved with cobble stones. In
1Wistar v. Baptist Publication Society, 2 W. N. 333.
'Walsh v. Luburg, 10 C. C. 641. In City v. O'Brien an action for
debt for a penalty for the constructing of a party-wall in a certain pro-
hib'ted way the defendant's plea that the city's officers agreed to permit
the construction, was held bad, on demurrer.
'5 Dist. 689. An iron beam being a part of the party-wall, the court
did not compel the removal of it, and the substitution of some other
material.
'Hurlburt v. Firth, 10 Phila. 135.
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1870 an opera-house was erected on B, facing on Chestnut Street.
On its rear, a stone foundation wall was built, which is since found
to project a few inches upon the side of A. Upon this foundation
a brick wall was built wholly within the north line of lot B. Be-
tween its pilasters, the wall receded four inches and in these reced-
ing parts were windows and doors. The owner of A files a bill
in 1902 to compel the closing of the windows and doors, and to
prohibit egress from the building upon the alley on lot A or in-
gress into it from that alley. The bill was dismissed. Mestrezat
J.,.affirms several principles. A party-wall does not need to rest
equally upon the two lots. It may be wholly on one, and still be a
party-wall,.if it was intended so to be by the builder, or is subse-
quently treated as such by the owners of the lot.. The owner of
a lot is not precluded from erecting a party-wall because the ownar
of the next lot has already erected a division wall wholly upon his
own land. The wall erected on B was not a party-wall, although
its foundation projected across the line, because the projection was
not intended, and a party-wall was not intended. Evidence that
.t was not intended, is the existence of the alley and of the duty
of the owner of it, to allow it to continue as such. The builder on B
did not anticipate that the wall would ever be used by the owner of
.A. There was no agreement that it should be a party-wall. Plaintiff
did not regard it as such for he did not call in the proper officers
to locate the line. Jefendant also did not call them in. The
knowledge of the exact location of the line was difficult. Not
being a party-wall, the maintenance of doors and windows in it
will not be enjoined. The remedy for the intrusion of the wall
;-at law. If the doors are -used for trespassing upon the alley
che remedy is at law. It is not intimated that the owner of A
might. hereafter use the wall. It is said- that he could erect a
party-wall, notwithstanding that the wail on B exists.
[Concluded in March number].
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MOOT COURT.
IN RE flARY JOHNSON'S ESTATE.
Conditional Divorce-Remarriage.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Mary Hendricks was, July .,, 1900 married to John Anderson. Foi
his desertion she, in Sept. 1903, began proceedings in divorce which were
ended by a decrec entered Jan. 11, 1904 divorcing her on condition that
she pay the costs of the proceeding. A year later, not having paid the
costs she married Win. Johnson. She lived with him until Jan 13, 1908
when she died. Her personal estate for distribution in the Orphans' Court
is $10,000. Win. Johnson claims it as husband. There are no children
and no creditors.
BROWN for the Claimant.
A proviso in a decree of divorce suspending the decree until the costs
are paid is a nullity. Mickle vs. Alabama, 21 So. Rep. 66; Confer's Est.,
17 D. R. 742.
KiNARD for the Defence.
The conditions in a decree of divorce must be complied with, or the
marriage relation continues. Moore vs. Moors, 121 Mass.232.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BUTLER, J.-The law authorizing the courts to grant decrees of
divorce not only specifies the causes or grounds for which divorces may
be obtained, but also specifies two distinct classes of divorce: One from
tle bonds of matrimony, the other from bed and board. After a divorce
from the bonds of matrimony, the person to whom has been granted the
divorce may, as a rule, marry again, and in the life-time of the" person
from whom he or she was divorced.
In a divorce from bed and board only, however, the right or privilege
of either party to the divorce proceedings to marry again during the life
time of the party from whom the divorce was obtained, is not sanctioned
by the law of this commonwealth.
In the case of Mary Johnson's Estate now before the court for consid-
eration, there is involved a proper, legal distribution of property amounting
in value to the sum of ten thousand dollars, the whole of which is claimed
by a William Johnson as husband of the said Mary Johnson he alleging
that her marriage to him after her divorce from her first husband, John
Anderson, was a valid contract of marriage.
There is no evidence before the court as to the character of the divorce
whether from the bonds of matrimony or from bed and board. The couri
has to assume, without evidence, that Mary Johnson was divorced from
the bonds of matrimony subject to a condition, namely: that she pay the
costs.
This condition is directly opposed to the act of 1815 sec. 12, which
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enacts, "that the court may award costs to the party in whose behalf the
decree or sentence (that is, of divorce) shall pass, or that each party shall
pay his or her own costs, but the act does not authorize the imposition of
all the costs upon the successful party.
Also in the case of Shoop's Appeal, 34 Pa. 233, where A sued B for
divorce, a decree granting a divorce was made which ordered A to pay
the costs. On appeal, the decree was reversed on the ground that under
the act of Wdar. 13th 1815, the court only had power to award costs to the
successful party, or to order each party to pay his and her own costs.
Again in Brinckle v. Brinckle, 6 W. N. C. 123, it was held that the
successful party is entitled to. costs.
Also in the case of Mickle v. State of Alabama, 21 Southern Reporter,
where at the end of a decree of divorce the court added "this decree
however, is suspended until the costs are paid, and then to be
in full forec and effect." It was held that, "the supension or
proposed suspension of the decree, added by way of postscript
after the solemn, deliberate adjudication that the bonds of xvdtrlmony
be dissolved * * * * * 'was not within the jurisdiction of the chan-
cellor, and is a mere nullity." Chief Justice Brickell then added "Justice
is not the subject of bargain and sale, and cannot be granted or decreed
because the parties are or are not of ability to pay the costs. When a final
decree is rendered, granting relief, the costs, whichever party Is derreed
to pay them, must be collected by the usual process of the court."
It was also held by Judge Butler, in the case of Baker v. Baker, 26 Pa.
Superior 553 that a decree of divorce having appearance of a final
judgment cannot be attacked, collaterally, because the decree had been
entered before the costs were paid.
This court is of the opinion that the condition attached to the decree
divorcing Mary Johnson from John Anderson was void; that her non-
performance of the condition had no effect upon her divorce; that her
marriage to William Johnson was legal, and therefore William Johnson
was her legal husband and is entitled to his share in the d'stribution of his
wife's estate.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR C0URT.
If the decedent was, at the time of the marriage contract with Johnson,
already the wife of Anderson, that contract was a nullity: Johnson is not
her husband, nor entitled to any portion of her estate.
On the other hand, if the decedent had been at the time of the at-
tempted marriage with Johnson, already divorced from Anderson, the
marriage was valid, and Johnson is entitled to the whole of her personal
estate.
Proceedings for a divorce from Anderson had been begun in Sept.
1903 on the ground of his desertion. The last act done in these proceedings
was the entry of a decree Jan. 11th 1904, divorcing the libellant from
Anderson, "on condition that she pay the costs of the proceedings."
There was no warrant in the law for this decree. The act of March
13th 1815, directs that the court may award costs to the party in whose
behalf the sentence or decree shall pass, or that each party shall pay his ox
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her own costs. It has no power to assess the costs of the-libellee upon the
libellant. Shoop's Appeal, 34 Pa. 233.
Again there is no power in the court to condition the degree upon
the payment of the costs. The costs are incident to an absolute decree.
The court, in assumpsit, could not suspend its judgment on the payment of
costs; nor condition an injunction on such payment. The judgment, the
decree, is entered, and thereupon the costs fall upon the proper party. 'The
ordinary remedy for costs, is a A fa, an example of which -is found in
Brinckle v. Brinckle, C. W. .N. C. 205, or an attachment. Mickle -v State
of Alabama, 21 So. 66.
But, this is not an appeal from the decree in the divorce proceedings
and it cannot be here annulled or changed.
The question is, has the court decreed a divorce of the Andersons?
There is not -here an absolute decree written by the judge and delivered
by him to the prothonotary with a direction to him not to enter 'it upon
the record until the costs are paid. Perhaps until such entry'it would
not be deemed a decree; Baker v. Baker, 26 Super. 553, whereas after such
entry, though in violation of the instruction, it would be so decreed.
The only decree entered is -that the parties be divorced on condition
that the libellant pay the costs, that is, do a future act. Until that act it
done, no separation is intended. The court ought to have intended to
separate them at once, but it did not. The intention that a result shall
follow hereafter, if a certain event happens is not the .intention that it
shall happen at once. If then the decree is to be collaterally treated as
if it had been what it ought to have been, but was not, the court; sitting in
the collateral proceeding, is virtually making the decree that ought to h-ave
been made, but Nvas not made.
The statutes of Massachusetts and some other states, provide for a
decree nisi in divorce proceedings. If within six months after publication
or other notice, no one presents a valid objection to an absolute decree,
such decree is entered. But it has been uniformly held that the decree nisi
works no divorce. If a party, after such provisional decree marries -in
good faith, the marriage is a crime; it is void. Moors v. Moors, 121 Mass.
232; Graves v. Graves,. 108 Mass. 314; Edgerly v. Edgerly, 112 Mass. 53.
In Cook v. Cook, 144 Mass. 163, the libellant was entitled to a decree
absolute on Nov. 20th. Anticipating that it would be obtained, she arranged
for a second marriage on the evening of that day. Her attorney failed to
obtain the decree on that day, but obtained it on Nov. 21st. The marriage
however proceded.. The man'to whom she was thus married, subsequentl
filed a libel and procured a decree that the marriage was a nullity.
The decree must be accepted as it is. It ordains the divorce on it-e
condition that the costs be paid. They have not been paid. The -divorce
has then not taken place.
If the libellant was not pleased with the decree in that form,, she. should
have had it corrected by the court of common pleas itself or upon appeal.
It remains unreversed and unchanged.
• The result is perhaps regrettable. At least Johnson will regret it,
although the next of kin may find solace for his distress, in their owa- gain.
He might have seen that the costs were paid, and so completed the divorce
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and he might then have married the decedent again. His good faith is
entirely immaterial. Laws are not abolished by the good faith of those
who violate them. He could have been convicted of fornication and she
of adultery and bigamy, despite their innocence of intent. Moors v. Moors,
121 Mass. 232; Com. v. Thompson, 11 Allen, 23.
If the court desires to give to its officers a better security for their
fees than the law has given them, it is not compelled to enter a
conditional decree. It may deliver a decree, absolute in form, to be
entered by the officer only after the costs are paid; or it may in some way
declare its intention not to enter a decree until the costs are paid, and then
to enter it, and it may await the actual payment of the costs before
entering the decree. These methods are doubtless irregular and illegal.
But, if the court enters a decree conditioned on the payment of the costs
such decree has no effectiveness until the fulfilment of the condition. It
may by- a proper proceeding, be set aside, and an unconditional decree
entered. Or, the decree's validity being unattacked, its condition may be
fulfilled.
As then the only decree in the record conditions the legal separation
on an event that has not yet happened, Mrs. Anderson is still undivorced.
Her attempted marriage with Johnson is a nullity.
It may be said in respect to Confer's Estate, 17 Dist. 742, that the
decree there was not conditional. It was that the parties are divorced
and separated; that they shall be at liberty to marry again. After this
decree was the statement that it was not to be entered until the payment
of all the costs. Where the decree was written, whether the paper on
which it was written, was filed, whether the court regarded the writing
as the decree, or only the entry of it in the docket by the prothonotary,
does not distinctly appear. The court seems to find that the proviso about
entering the decree was separable from- it and a nullity, and that the
decree must be accepted as unmodified by it. But, in the case before us,
the decree was in its terms conditional. There was no unconditional
part separable from a conditional part.
Decree reversed.
COMMONWEALTH vs. WM. HARBISON.
Competency as a Witness of a Very Young Child. Religious Opinion
of Witness.
STATEMENT OF FArS.
Wm. Harbison is indicted for the murder of John Kingston. The
only witness to the killing was Sarah Kingston, a daughter of the deceased,
who was, at the time of the killing six years old, and at the time of the
trial six years and nine months old. To the Court's inquiry she said she
would be bound to tell the truth if she swore, but she had not heard of the
survival of the soul after death. Her parents were Univorsalists. She
did not know of God whom it was her duty to please, and who would be
displeased if she spoke falsely. She was sworn, and testified that Harbison
killed her father giving the circumstances.
156 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
WOHL for Commonwealth.
SPENCE for Defendant.
ZERBY, J.-The question to be decided here is whether this child of
the age of six years and nine months is competent, under the circumstances,
to testify. After a careful examination of the case we believe that she is.
Although there are no statutes on the question in this State, the general
rule is that if the trial Judge upon examining the infant, is satisfied as to
the intelligence of the infant and its comprehension of an obligation to tell
the truth, this is sufficient, and the infant may be sworn.
The whole purpose of the trial is to ascertain the truth and the oath
is in pursuance of that object. It the witness understands that this is
demanded and that 'punishment will follow its violation, it is sufficient.
Comm. vs. Furman 211 'Pa. 549. In the case at bar, upon the examination
by the trial Judge it was shown that the infant clearly comprehended the
difference between truth and falsehood and had a perfect understanding
of its obligation to tell the truth. This is all that the law requires.
In regards to the contention as to the religious beliefs of the child,
'we fully concur with the following quotation from 211 Pa. 549; It seems
to us that the crude and shadowy beliefs of small children concerning
God and the hereafter, are so uncertain, that the tests, based on religious
instruction, even though given by the trial Judge himself, are of little or
no moment, and should rather be discarded than followed in this enlight-
ened age.
The admissibility depends on the sense and reason the infant possesses
of the danger and impiety of falsehood, which is to be colleced from his
answers to questions propounded to him by the Court See Wigmore's
Cases No. 61, 159 United States 523.
In answer to the defendant's second and third points, we conclude that
to our minds this infant showed sufficient intelligence and mental develop-
ment to entitle her to be sworn and any distorted conceptions and any
wrong impressions, which she may have by reason of an overwrought
imagination, can be quite easily dispelled and corrected by cross-examina-
tion, which is one of the principal purposes of this method of procedure.
By means of the cross-examination it is quite possible to bring out all the
facts of the killing in a clear and concise manner, without any distortion
of the same, and from these facts it would be for the jury to 
decide whether
the killing was justifiable and in self-defense. Justice 
can not be allowed
to go by default on the simple supposition of what might have 
'been the
state of circumstances surrounding the killing, but on the contrary 
it is
adminstered from the facts as brought out at the 
trial on the witness
stand by competent witnesses, which we believe to have 
been done in the
case at bar, since we fully consider the infant 
a competent witness. See
2 Brews., 404, and therefore the motion for a new 
trial is dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The common law admits no one to testify, except 
under oath. The only
relaxation of this principle, in Pennsylvania, 
has been made in favor of
persons who conscientiously refuse to take 
an oath. Sarah Kingston
did not decline to take an oath, but was 
sworn.
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An oath is an appeal to God; Blair v. Seaver, 26 Pa. 274; Com. v.
Winnemore, 2 Brewst. 378; Cubbison v. McCreary, 2 W. & S. 262. "It
necessarily implies on the part of the witness, his belief in a Supreme
Be;ng. * * Without such belief the person cannot be subject to that
sanction which the law deems an indispensable test of truth. It is not
sufficient that the witness may believe himself bound to tell the truth out
of regard for the good of society merely, or through fear of punishment
for perjury if he testify falsely." Cubbison v. McCreary, supra. Wit-
nesses, 45 et seq.
This is the ancient law, and no legislation has changed it. The act
of May 32d 1887 P. L. 158, declares that with certain exceptions, "all
persons," in criminal cases, "'shall be fully competent witnesses," but it
has not been understood to dispense with the oath or with the religious
presuppositions of the oath.
The necessity of testifying under oath, extended to the testimony of
young children. In Rex v. Brasier, 1 Leach, C. L. 199, it was unanimously
held, Brasier being tried for assaulting a child under 7 years of age, with
the intent to commit rape "No testimony whatever can be legally received
except upon oath, and that an infant, though under the age of seven years
may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, provid.d such infant appears, on
strict examination by the court, to possess a sifficient knowledge of the
nature and consequences of an oath * * * * but if they are found
incompetent to take an oath, their testimony cannot be received." Best
correctly says that this case "settled the modern law and practice relative
to the admissibility of the testimony of children." Evidence, 153. Un-
fortunately while in England it is no longer necessary for the child to be
sworn; Stat. 32 & 33 Vict. C. 68, s. 4, there is in Pennsylvania no similar
statute. Nor have the courts professed to have the power to repeal the
ancient law. Com. v. Capero, 35 Super. 392. -
The learned court below relies upon Commonwealth v. Furman, 211
Pa. 549. But, that is scarcely to be dignified with the role of overturning
a century old rule of the common law. The opinion is a so called opinion
"per Curiam." The child's testimony, admitted by the trial court, says the
writer, "was not material to the establishment of the prisoner's guilt, and
had no practical bearing on it." Sarah Kingston was the "only witness to
the killing," and her testimony therefore was indispensable to the convic-
tion. In the Furman case no inquiry was made concerning the witness'
knowledge of God. He was asked whether he knew what would "become
of" him, where he would "go,' if he told an untruth. He said yes, but
apparently explained no further. He did not disavow knowledge of the
existence of God. Sarah Kingston "did not know of God whom it "was
her duty to please" by telling the truth. She lacked then the psychological
postulate of an oath. She ought not to have been sworn; and therefore,
her testimony ought not to have been heard.
That she did not know of a state of existence post mortem did not
disqualify her.
The law requiring an oath doubtless ought to be changed. It operates, in
so far as it works at all-to exclude from the witness box, truthful per-
sons; while it admits annually hundreds of perjurers. For sundry reasons,
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the belief in God professed by the witness, has slight deterrent effect
upon him. He falsely professes the belief, or he but vaguely and hazily
apprehends the object of his faith; or he thinks God is not listening; or
he believes himself to have some talisman by which he can propitiate
the divine anger, etc., etc. The time has fully come to abolish the require-
ment of an-oath, not merely in cases in which the witness, believing in
God, thinks that he has forbidden swearing, but in all cases whatsoever.
But the legislature ought to do the abolishing and not a court. The
abolition ought to be effected consciously, deliberately, professedly and
not surreptitiously nor by an unauthoritative decision.
It is abhorrent to see a man guilty of a murder committed in the
presence of a child only, escape, for that reason. But it is more abhorrent
to permit a new law ex post facto to be applied to his case. Tht neglect
of the legislature or of the courts to ameliorate the law in advance of the
crime, is a bad reason for injecting an innovation into the midst of the
trial by a judge to whom the state has not intended to delegate its legis-
lative power.
Judgment reversed.
JACOB HARMON vs. GEORGE TOPLIFF.
Money Lent to bt Used on a Wager.
STAiEMENT OF FACTS.
Topliff about to make a bet of 1000 dollars on the election for presi-
dent, but having no money, asked Harmon for it, telling Harmon the use
he intended to make of it. Harmon,'a close friend, dissuaded him from
making the bet, but, not-successful, lent him the money, taking his note
at three months. The money was in fact not used for the bet, but for
some business purpose. Topliff defends on the ground that the object of
the borrowing, known to Harmon, was to bet on the election.
MCWHINNEY for Plaintiff.
WooDWvRD for Defendant.
MOYER J.-Upon this statement of facts we think the plaintiff
should recover. Almost the entire argument of the defendant is based
upon the assumption that the Pennsylvania statutes against wagering on
elections apply to this case; and that the plaintiff acted in violation of
these statutes.
The statutory law of Pennsylvania against wagering on elections is
as follows:
"Wagering or betting on the event of an election, held under the con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth, are hereby prohibited, and all contracts or promises
founded thereon are declared to be null and void." Act of Mar. 24th,
1817, Section I.
"If any person or persons shall make any bet or wager upon the result
of any election within this Commonwealth, or shall offer to make any such
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bet or wager, either by verbal proclamation thereof, or by any written
or printed advertisement, challenge or invite any person or persons to
make such bet or wager, upon conviction thereof, he or they shall forfeit
and pay three times the amount so bet or offered to be bet."
Act of July 2, 1839, Section 115, also sections 116, 11/, and 118 of the
same act.
In Webster's Unabridged Dictionary we find that, "wagering is the
staking or pledging of something upon the event of a contest. or on some
question that is to be decided, or on some casuality." In Brua's Appeal,
55 Pa. 94, Thompson, C. J., remarked: "Anything which induces men to
risk their money or property without any other hope of return than to get
for nothing any given amount from another, is gambling, and demoilizing
to the community." In the case before us' Harmon made the loan of money
to Topliff independent of any wager or bet; he was not to secure any
advantage or gain from any bet which Topliff might enter into, nor suffer
any loss from the same; and furthermore, the loan was not only made
before any.bet was entered into, but the facts show 'us that ultimately no
het was made-Topliff used the money for some business purpose. The
loan was not made with the express purpose that it was to carry some
specific bet into execution; but made only on the assertion that it would
be bet on the election. Harmon had this knowledge and that was all, and,
moreover, he had attempted to dissuade the defendant, his friend, from
hetting, but was unsuccessful. From these facts, it is impossible f). us
to see how it can be held that the loan made by Harmon was a waer, or
was founded on a wager; in consequence of which the statutes before
referred to, will not apply. Scott v. Duffy, 14 Pa. 18.
In Waugh v. Beck, 114 Pa. 422, the court held that, "one who know-
ingly and with the purpose of furthering a gambling transaction in pur-
chasing commodities on margin, lends money to another, he cannot recover
it. It' is not enough to defeat recovering by the lender that he knew
of the borrower's intention to use it in a gambling transaction, in pur-
chasing commodities on a margin, he must know that the borrower was
purposing such use of the loan and must have been implicated as a con-
federate in the transaction though not necessarily Tor gain." The defen-
dant goes so far as to say, that under the ruling in the above case, the
court might feel constrained to allow a recovery, but that there is a clear
distinction where the act for which the money was advanced contemplated
the violation of. statutory law. We believe we have, already shown fully
tl-at his contention of the defendant, that the statutes against wagering
on elections apply here, is erroneous.
The vital distinction in this case is to be made between the act of
loaning money with. an express understanding and intentiofi that it is to be
used in betting or wagering, and the act of loaning money with mere
knowledge that it is to be so used. In the first case, clearly, the money can
not be recovered; but in the second instance, there is an absence of guilty
purpose, and there may even be a solicitation to keep the other party from
an illegal act, and such is the case before us. "It does not follow that
a lender has a guilty purpose merely because he knows or believes that
the borrower has. There may be a visible line between the motives of the
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two. If it were not so, men would have great responsibilities for the
motives and acts of others. A person may loan money to his friend,-
to the man, and not to his purpose. He may not be willing to deny h.s
friend, however much disapproving his acts. In order to find the lender
in fault, he must himself have an intention that the money shall be illegally
used. There must be a combination of intention between lender and
borrower-a union of purposes." Tyler v. Carlisle, 79 Maine, 210.
We agree that it seems to be the purpose of our legislature and
courts of law to discourage the pernicious practice of betting on elections,
and to leave parties who chose to embark into contracts of this kind to
recover as they can according to the code of honor under which they
originated. Most certainly such ought to be the law. Too often does
betting reach such abnormal proportions as to taint and corrupt the very
elections themselves. Nothing should be striven for more zealously by a
government such as ours than the purity and integrity of tbe public
franchise. But the spirit of animosity to election betting can not come to
judgment here. We are unable to see how the transaction between Har-
mon and Topliff can be framed into the similitude of a wager. We believe
that we have clearly shown that this loan was independent of any wager,
and although made with knowledge that it was to be so used, persuasion
was exerted to discourage such venture. And who dare say, but that this
persuasion by Harmon, was not the final influence that kept Topliff from
betting? Are we to leave such a person at the mercy of a would h(
rogue? No. Honor and good faith seem to require that the monev
loaned should be repaid. And we have not been informed, by the de'en-
dant, of a statute or decree which prevents it.
Judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiff to the sum'of one ou,;-
and dollars.
OII,ON OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The act of March 24th 1817 prohibits wagers or bets upon elections
national or state, and adds "all contracts or promises founded thereon are
declared to be entirely null and void." Because thus void, it has been
held that when the money bet is still in the hands of the stakeholder, it
can be recovered, even after the issue of the election has been decided, by
the loser, from the stakeholder. McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S. & R. 147;
Forsht v. Green, 53 Pa. 138. If one of the primary offenders can thus
recover the money, staked by him, it would be singular, if one who has
lent to him the money, which he has staked could not recover it from him;
a fortiori the money which thus borrowed, with the intention to stake it,
is subsequently not used in betting at all.
It has been held that A, who lends money to B with knowledge that B
intends to use-it in gambling, may recover it from B, unless, in addition
A intended that B, should thus use the money; IVwaugh v. Beck, 114 Pa.
422. In a sense, when A does an act with knowledge that a certain effect
will result he intends that effect. But, he may not desire that effect.
He may deprecate it. He does the act not because he wishes to achieve
effect X, but because he aims at something else, which he would, were it
practicable, prefer to effect, without incidentally effecting X. When that is
the fact A in a stricter sense of the word, may not be said to intend X.
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Harmon did not lend the money to Topliff in order that Topliff
should bet. He deprecated; and advised against the betting. So far as
appears, he would have more willingly lent the money, if Topliff had
wanted it for ssme other purpose. Harmon did intend that Topliff should
have the $1000. He did not intend that Topliff should use it in betting,
but only that he should be able, if he would, to use it in betting; but with
the wish that he should abstain from such a use.
Thinkers who have troubled themselves with the invention of theod-
icies have made a similar discrimination. The Creator has put certain
powers in man, among them, the power to kill, lie, cheat. He must have
intended man to have the power, which he has thus conferred. Being
prescient, he has also foreseen 'what bad uses man would make of this
power; that he would kill, lie and cheat. But, this gift or loan of power
with knowledge that it would thus be used, does not justify the attribu-
tion to the Almiglty of the intention that man should thus use it. If we
can exonerate the Creator of the sins of the creature, despite his having
made those sins possible with knowledge that he was making them possible,
we ought to be able to hold Harmon guiltless of Topliff's bet, despite
his foreknowledge of it.
Had Topliff actually made the bet, Harmon could we think, have
recovered the money. But the bet was not made. The money was used
legitimately. A fortiori should Harmon be able to recover it.
The unusually complete and able briefs of the counsel and the lucid
discussion of the learned judge, are worthy of commendation.
Judgment affirmed.
SARAH MALLORY vs. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Stipulation in Life Insurance Policy against Suicide.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The defendant issued to John Mallory a policy for $10,000 containing
the condition that "the death of the assured shall not occur by his own
hand." Policy was payable to his widow if she survived. He died having
purposely killed himself while in a fit of melancholia by means of a pistol
inserted into his mouth and then discharged.
SPENCER for Plaintiff.
COHEN for Defendant.
WANNER J.-The decision of this case rests upon the construction
to be given to the word melancholia. Bouvier's Dictionary defines
melancholia as an ancient term for the word monomania. It bore this
name because it was always supposed to be attended by dejection of mind
and gloomy ideas. The term melancholia at the present time, is applied
generally to persons contemplating suicide.
It is well settled that the condition contained in this policy is valid
and binding. A well taken exception to the rule is in the case of insanity
which deprive the victim of his knowledge of the nature and consequences
of the act of taking his life.
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The plaintiff relies on 120 If. S. 527 to found a recovery in this case.
A glance at that case reveals that it is not applicable to the one in hand.
The policy in that case was to insure against ac~idental injury which had
to be the sole and proximate cause of the disability or death. The policy
further excluded recovery in case of death by disease, fever, or self-
destruction. It appeared, however, that the assured was insane, another
distinction from the case in hand. The case of American Life Insurance
Co. v. Isett's, Adm's 74 Pa. 176, cited by the paintiff is another case of
insanity.
Melancholia or monomania which Bouvier regards as interchangeable
terms cannot be classed with insanity. The words imply a mania on one
particular point or idea,of one who is regarded as sane in all other respects.
A man thus afflicted may be and often is a very good citizen. No man
is perfect and it may be conceded that all men have peculiarities which
may be magnified into manias so as to baffle a jury in a civil suit like this.
V hat protection would the L-fe Insurance Companies have, if the law al-
lowed a recovery, against a stipulation to the contrary, whenever a case of
melancholia was established. It is popularly supposed that a person had
been afflicted with melancholia whenever he takes his own life.
Melancholia in itself does not often bring about suicide, it being
superinduced by financial distress, business reverses, disappointment irr
love affairs, or the like. It is not fair virtually to hold that life insurance
companies insure a happy career to the assured.
To allow a recovery in case of suicide, against which the policy did
not assume the responsibility, the authorities are uniform in declaring
that the act must have been involuntary, and of such a nature that the
victim was unable to understand the natural and probable consequences
of his act. Take the case of a suicide now, he is abject in spirits and wants
to avoid the trials of life: to accomplish his end he deliberately takes his
life. Who will argue that that is not a voluntary act? Again take this
case where the deceased fired a revolver into his mouth, a very vital point.
Who will say that he did not know the nature and consequence of his act;
if the deceased had fired into his hand or foot, the contention would not
be in vain. At common law, a suicide's estate was forfeited to the state-
This harsh rule of law has since been repudiated. Suicides, as a rule,
shock the community and would be prevented with zeal whenever possible.
Public policy requires that suicides should be held in check by any legitimate
means. To allow a voluntary suicide to recover in this case and thu.
increase his estate would be to foster suicide and work injustice to life
insurance companies as well.
Therefore in view of sound reason, public policy and the uniformity
of the authorities judgment must be for defendants.
OPINiuN OF SUPREME cOURT.
The defendant assumed no liability, if the death of the assured should
occur "by his own hand." This expression applies to a death caused by
the assured irrespective of the agency employed to effect it, to a death
by poison, Hartman v. Keystone'Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466, by shooting, etc.
But, the self-killing must be by a responsible agent. If it occurs in
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consequence of an insanity that is incompatible with responsibility, it is not
considered as within the condition of the policy, 4 Cooley Briefs on the
Law of Insurance, 3242, 3243.
Self-killing by an insane person does not defeat the policy, unless it
stipulates that such self-killing, even by an insane person, shall have that
effect.
The only question before us is as to the irresponsibility of the assured
for the suicide. He purposely killed himself; that is, he desired to kill
himself; he selected the means, and applied them, in order to effectuate
that object, and the object was thus accomplished. He understood then
the acts that he was doing, and the expectable sequences. He supposed that
the discharge of a pistol into the mouth would destroy him. He was not
therein mistaken.
There are some cases that intimate that the person who kills himself
or another, must in order to be responsible, know the moral quality of the
act; that is, apparently that the act is reprehended by the moral law,
or by God. See Ins. ,o. v. Isett's Adm. 74 Pa. 176, where a decision is not
given. It does not appear what the opinion of John Mallory was as to the
moral character of the act of self-destruction. He may have believed it
innocent or even praiseworthy. He may have believed it wicked.
Melancholia does not so constantly involve a perversion of the judgment
as to the moral quality of acts as to warrant the inference that Mallory's
judgment was perverse and that he did not entertain the prevailing notion
concerning the ethical quality of the deed. So far as appears then, he had
the sane man's knowledge both of the qualities of the physical act, of its
physical consequence, viz death, and of its moral quality.
The existence of irresponsibility has been recognized in this state, even
when the patient is capable of knowing and knows both the physical and
and moral qualities of the act; its probable effects; the moral quality which
the opinions of men ascribe to it; and even when the act is done in order
to produce these probable .effects. There may be in the opinion of Gibson,
C. J., Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, and of Ludlow J., Sayers v. Coin. 88 Pa.
291, an "irresistible inclination" to do an act, even a homicidal act, which
will exempt the doer from the guilt which would ordinarily attend the
commission of it. See Trickett Crim. Law, 1076 et seq.. If criminal
liability for the killing of a human being may be thus deleted it would
properly follow that an act of self-destruction, perpetrated under the
"irresistible inclination," should not be imputed to the suicide, so as to annul
or avoid the policy issued upon his life, although in American Life Ins.
Co. v. Isetts Adm. 74 Pa. 180, the trial court evidently thinks that the only
insanity that would preserve the liability of the company, in a case' of
suicide, would be the insanity expressed in a non-perception of the causal
relation between the act done- and death, and in an inability to fo m an
intelligent intent to take one's life. "If" said Mayer P. J., as Murcur J.,
paraphrases his doctrine, "the insured possessed sufficient mental capacity
to form an intelligent intent to take his own life, and was conscious that
the act he was about to commit would effect that object it avoided the
policy."
That an insanie impulse putting self-killing beyond the power to resist
may make suicide ineffectual to discharge the policy, has been recognized;
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4 Cooley, Briefs on the Law of Insurance, 3246. Hunt J., was of opinion
that if "the suicide is committed when the patient is not able to understand
the moral character, the general nature consequences and effect of the
act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane
impulse, which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the
contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable."
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U. S. 580.
An exculpating insanity cannot be inferred from the mere fact of
suicide; Colonial Trust Co. v. Hoffstot, 219 Pa. 497; 4 Cooley, Briefs etc.,
3257. Mallory's self-murder however occurred while he was "in a
fit of melancholia." There is evidence independent of the suicide, of his
melancholia. Might the jury have safely inferred the causal relation of
the latter to the- former? "Suicide is an ever-present danger in melan-
cholia. More suicides occur in this disease than in any other form of
insanity, and a large proportion of all cases of suicide occur in melan-
choliacs. Suicide, in fact, is a logical sequence of melancholia. It is a
result to which the disease directly tends." 1 Wh. & Stille's Medical Juris-
prudence, 633. Melancholia then often does superinduce suicide. We
think the question ought to have been submitted to the jury whether
Mallory was at the instant of killing himself without the power to refrain.
The delicacy of such a question we freely concede. What is power?
By what indications does it reveal itself? How can we ever know whether,
at the moment of willing act X, there was a power to have willed act Y;
or to have refrained from willing any act at all? The courts however,
have assumed that there is in the normal man a power, at any instant, to
will alternately, that there are forms of abnormality in which this power
is lost; and that jurors are able to say in particular cases, whether the
power existed or not.
The objections to allowing a recovery are strongly stated by the learned
court below. They are serious. But the company can escape the risk by
expressly refusing to insure against death, when caused by one's self,
whether the causal act was induced by insanity or not. Not having so
stipulated, should it be exempt, when the self-killing is an irresponsible
act? It is true that the act is "voluntary" if by voluntary is meant "pur-
posed." Mallory conceived his death, wished it, resolved to produce it,
selected shooting himself in the mouth as the means, and accordingly
shot himself. But these events are not inconsistent according to some
authorities, with an inability to avoid doing them. Behind them may have
lain an irresistible impulse. Whether there actually lay such impulse, some
one must decide. The facts developed warranted and required the sub-
mission to the jury of the decision of the question.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
